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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3173 
___________ 
 
NICHOLAS PURPURA, a sovereign citizen, and for people similarly situated in New 
Jersey that hold citizenship in United States,  
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GOVERNOR CHRIS CHRISTIE; PRES. SENATE STEVEN M. SWEENEY; 
ASSEMBLY SPEAKER VINCENT PRIETO; ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN J. 
HOFFMAN; JOSEPH RICK FUENTES, Firearms Superintendent; JUDGE MICHAEL 
A. DONIO; JUDGE RUDOLPH A. FILKO; JUDGE EDWARD A. JEREJIAN; JUDGE 
THOMAS V. MANAHAN.; JUDGE JOSEPH W. OXLEY; JUDGE RONALD LEE 
REISNER; JUDGE LEONARD P. STARK; JUDGE RUGGERO J. ALDISERT; 
LORRETTA WEINBERG; SENATOR RICHARD J. CODEY; ANNETTE QUIJANO; 
PETER J. BARNES, III; REED GUSCIORA; CLEOPATRA G. TUCKER; GORDON 
M. JOHNSON; PAMELA R. LAMPITT; JOHN F. MCKEON; SEAN KEAN; BONNIE 
WATSON COLEMAN; ROBERT SINGER; NIA H. GILL; L. GRACE SPENCER; 
SHIRLEY K. TURNER; PATRICK J. DIEGNAN.; MILA M. JASEY; TIM EUSTACE; 
GABRIELA M. MOSQUERA; JASON O’DONNELL; GARY SCHAER; LOUIS D. 
GREENWALD; CHARLES MAINOR; VALERIE VAINIERI HUTTLE; HERBERT 
CONAWAY; RICHARD COOK; ACHILLE TAGLIALATELA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-15-cv-03534) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 11, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
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(Opinion filed: April 19, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Nicholas Purpura appeals the District Court’s orders dismissing 
his complaint and denying his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).  For the reasons set 
forth below, we will affirm.   
 Purpura objects to the New Jersey statute regulating the issuance of permits to 
carry handguns in public.  See N.J.S.A. § 2C:58–4.  In the District Court, he sued a host 
of defendants, including the politicians who passed the statute, the judges who have 
upheld it, and the lawyers and public officials who have administered it.  He presented 
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.  In short, Purpura alleged that the 
defendants have conspired to enact, defend, and apply an unconstitutional law.   
 The parties filed a number of motions in the District Court.  Purpura sought a 
default judgment, while the defendants filed motions to dismiss.  Ultimately, the District 
Court granted the motions to dismiss, concluding that Purpura lacked standing to litigate 
his claims.  The Court also denied Purpura’s motion for a default judgment.  Purpura then 
filed a Rule 59(e) motion, which the Court denied, and a timely notice of appeal. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  We review de novo the District 
Court’s standing determination, see Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 266 
(3d Cir. 2014), and review the Court’s denial of the Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of 
discretion, see Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 The District Court did not err in concluding that Purpura lacked standing.  Article 
III of the Constitution limits federal judicial power to the adjudication of cases or 
controversies.  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  “That case-or-controversy requirement is 
satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing.”  Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., 554 
U.S. 269, 273 (2008).  To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show, among 
other things, that he “has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized 
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000).  We “assess standing as of 
the time a suit is filed.”2  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1157 (2013). 
 Here, Purpura failed to plead that he had suffered an injury in fact.  He did not 
claim that he had applied for and been denied a permit or that the statute had otherwise 
harmed him.  As the District Court explained, Purpura’s complaint, while presenting 
                                              
1 We conclude that the District Court’s dismissal without prejudice is a final order under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 because Purpura has elected to stand on his complaint.  See Frederico 
v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2007). 
2 In applying the standing rules, “our primary project is to separate those with a true stake 
in the controversy from those asserting ‘the generalized interest of all citizens in 
constitutional governance.’”  Freedom from Religion Found. Inc v. New Kensington 
Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 469, 476 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982)). 
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extensive legal argument concerning the constitutionality of § 2C:58–4, contained just a 
single allegation that linked the statute to Purpura: Purpura claimed that, if a police 
officer stopped him when he was on his way to a shooting range, and if Purpura were 
wearing his entrance tag to the shooting range, and if the officer noticed that tag and 
inquired whether Purpura was transporting firearms, and if Purpura had made a mistake 
in storing his guns or failed to separate his firearm from his ammunition, he could be 
punished.  This “highly attenuated chain of possibilities” does not satisfy the injury-in-
fact requirement.  Id. at 1148; see also City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983); In 
re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d 451, 461 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 Purpura did allege in his complaint that certain other individuals have been 
harmed by § 2C:58–4.  However, to establish third-party standing, a litigant must 
demonstrate that (1) he has suffered an “injury in fact” that provides him with a 
“sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute”; (2) he has a “close 
relation to the third party”; and (3) there exists “some hindrance to the third party’s 
ability to protect his or her own interests.”  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Purpura has satisfied none of those requirements here.  See 
generally Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 295 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 376 (3d Cir. 2003).  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal order.3 
                                              
3 Because the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, it properly denied 
Purpura’s request for a default judgment.  See Holt v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 408 
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 The District Court also denied Purpura’s Rule 59(e) motion, explaining that Rule 
59(e) motions are appropriate only to rectify plain errors of law or to offer newly 
discovered evidence, and may not be used to relitigate old matters or to present evidence 
or arguments that could have been offered earlier.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 
U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008); Blystone, 664 F.3d at 415.  Purpura does not meaningfully 
challenge that decision here. 
 We will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
                                                                                                                                                  
F.3d 335, 336-37 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
